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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000423

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SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC: OPERATION RUDIA II UPDATE (APRIL 24,
2009)

REF: KAMPALA 380

Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
) .

¶1. (SBU) Summary: This cable is a periodic update on the regional military operation against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) known as Operation Rudia II. This report is not meant to provide an overarching narrative or polished analysis of the operation, but rather offers spot information gleaned in Uganda only, from credible U.S. Mission sources here. We recognize the regional scope of the operation and the fact that our sources may be limited in their knowledge and perspective on Rudia II. End Summary.

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MILITARY SITUATION
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¶2. (S NF) The U.N. Mission in Congo (MONUC) Force Commander, Lt. Gen. General Babacar Gueye, believes the biggest problem for Rudia II is operational planning. Without it, the Ugandan Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF), Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), and the UN Mission in Congo (MONUC) will find it difficult to effectively move forces in a timely manner to block and eliminate the LRA. On April 15, Gueye was in Kampala to discuss ways to enhance coordination between the UPDF, FARDC, and MONUC. In a meeting with DATT, Gueye said that the FARDC does not have adequate planning mechanisms, reliable intelligence collection or dissemination on the LRA, and little or no tactical ability to move their forces (air or ground). He said that MONUC could provide FARDC with logistics support, but that the U.S., MONUC, and UPDF would have to determine how to work with the FARDC on the collection and dissemination of information.

¶3. (S NF) Gueye recommends biweekly planning meetings at the operational level that will harmonize MONUC logistics support with U.S. intelligence information on LRA locations to better coordinate operations. DATT told Gueye that there are a number of intelligence sharing issues that would need to be worked out and that he would raise the issue at higher levels.

¶4. (S NF) Another area of concern is the "red line" that separates Ugandan and Congolese operational areas. The line is located between Dungu and Faradje, which is becoming problematic because the largest, most dangerous concentration of LRA forces has moved southwest of Faradje. Ugandan military officials are concerned that the FARDC has not taken any actions against this group.

¶5. (S NF) In other developments, the UPDF killed LRA Brigadier General Ocan Bunia on April 18.

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POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
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¶6. (C) Nuno Tomas, the head of the UN Special Envoy's Office in Kampala told P/E Chief on April 23 that LRA spokesman David Matsanga, the "master of distortion," was working overtime spreading lies about discussions of a cease-fire. As previously reported, Chissano relayed Matsanga's request for a cease-fire to Museveni on March 28 (reftel). Museveni consulted the coalition partners and told Chissano that if Kony called Chissano directly, he would consider a temporary three-day cease-fire. Kony has not called Chissano. Tomas warned that Matsanga's assertions that Museveni agreed to a ceasefire within 15 days (from April 10) as completely baseless.

¶7. (C) Later in the same evening, Matsanga told P/E Chief that President Museveni had accepted the LRA leader Joseph Kony's request for a temporary cease-fire. The cease-fire would enable the LRA to reach the Rikwangba assembly area to make a telephone call to Chissano without being attacked. Matsanga claimed that Museveni only allowed three days for the cease-fire. Matsanga complained this was not enough time and that Kony needed at least 21 days to do so. He also said that Kony had given Museveni until April 25 to publicly announce a temporary cease-fire and that he has not yet done so. As a result, Matsanga decided to call P/E Chief to warn that he (Matsanga) could not be held accountable for what would happen next. He claimed the LRA was poised to re-enter northern Uganda and resume attacks.

¶8. (C) Comment: Matsanga continues to grasp at any opportunity to remain a player. We are hearing that he is highly indebted in Nairobi to Indian businessmen and the

KAMPALA 00000423 002 OF 002

Ugandan diaspora. The Ugandan Government believes that a cease-fire is only a ruse to alleviate pressure on Kony. End Comment.

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HUMANITARIAN SITUATION
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¶9. (C) Medicines San Frontieres (MSF) Switzerland's Laurent Gaubert met with emboffs on April 22. She reported that there has been an increase in LRA attacks near Doruma, south of Dungu, and south of Faradje. MSF Switzerland pulled their medical personnel out of Bili, DRC two weeks ago, but continue to operate in Inbukolu and Awara. She said that the situation in Doruma was deteriorating after the Congolese Presidential Guard units were replaced with mixed Congolese units from the Kivus. These units are reportedly abusing the local populations. MSF reports a tripling of internally-displaced persons (IDPs) seeking refuge near Aba, DRC. In the last three weeks, Gaubert said the IDP population had swelled from four thousand to eleven thousand. The IDPs are fleeing eastward from Faradje. They report rumors of aircraft and helicopters dropping supplies. Gaubert also said that non-governmental organizations in Dungu are reporting that the LRA has demanded that humanitarian organizations take care of wounded LRA fighters or the LRA will begin targeting them. (Note: We doubt the LRA made this demand. The LRA has never done so in the past and targeting western humanitarian workers would result in increased military pressure on the LRA. End Note.)
HOOVER